Current countermeasures against last level cache (LLC) based non-memory-sharing sidechannel attacks (LNSA), which is a powerful and practical cache attack in the cloud, fail in practical due to their shortage of generality or efficiency. Motivated by random cache access, we propose a novel defense method called dynamic remapping which dynamically changes mapping relationship from virtual memory to cache at hypervisor layer. It aims to confuse the attacker about the relationship between observed cache activities and values of demanded secret. In order to guarantee scalability and deployability, we formalize the problem of remapping, and design a sequential classified selection algorithm to decide how to remap all those protected memory. Furthermore, we implement MemWander, a prototype system integrated in Xen and OpenStack which are popular cloud settings. And its security improvement and performance overhead are evaluated on various applications and an apache server as a simulated cloud service. The experimental results show that MemWander not only provides enough security guarantees for general services in cloud, but also induces low performance overhead as no more than 7%, which is tolerable in most scenarios.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing has brought the advantage of flexible, easy, and low-price utilization of computing resource due to the nature of resource sharing between different tenants in its virtualized structure. However, this feature makes cloud users prone to various side-channel attacks aiming at stealing sensitive information (which we also call as secret in this paper) at the same time. Specifically, memory cache is a kind of shared resource that can reflect the execution characters of processes in the cloud, which renders cache-based attacks more practical and dangerous.
In this paper, we focus on the defense against LLC-based Non-memory-sharing Side-channel Attack (LNSA), a type of side channel that relies on the shared LLC between the attacker and the victim. This kind of attack deduces sensitive information from the victim through monitoring its activities on LLC which is shared between different CPU cores, thus enabling cross-core attacks. The character of nonmemory-sharing refers to disabling memory deduplication between different virtual machines (VMs), which is required by memory-sharing attacks such as Flush+Reload [3] - [6] . It indicates that this kind of cache attacks can be more widely applicable in cloud environments. Both conditions are normally configured in a lot of public clouds [7] , which makes defense against LNSA quite essential and meaningful.
Currently, a variety of countermeasures have been proposed, which can be classified according to the layer of virtualized structure they defend on. Hardware-based approaches mainly consists of cache partitioning and access randomization [8] - [11] . However, such solutions is quite complex because they require lots of considerations such as side-effects (e.g., power consumption) and economic feasibility, as well as extensibility and flexibility. Therefore, it takes years before these hardware-based approaches can be integrated into production and finally used in clouds. Defenses have also been proposed at the application level (e.g., partitioning a cryptographic key across multiple VMs [12] ), or inside the guest OS (e.g. injecting noise into protected processes on L1 and L2 caches [13] ). Both suffer from vastly different specifications for various targets, resulting in poor generality.
Approaches proposed inside hypervisor contains hiding the execution time of programs [14] , [15] and altering the observable timing [16] , which would possibly influence the normal operations of cloud components. Varadarajan et al. [17] suggested modification of Xen scheduler to restrict the frequency of an attacker's CPU preempting, so as to address the attack of Zhang et al. [18] . However, it cannot defend against cross-core cache attacks which do not need CPU preempting. Other hypervisor-based solutions include statistical multiplexing of shared resources to prevent eavesdropping [19] - [22] . The common disadvantage of such isolation-based solutions is reducing utilization of resources such as memory pages and CPU cache.
There are researches about the placement algorithm of newly coming VMs. They aim to reduce the possibility of co-residency between the attacker's VM and the victim's VM [23] - [25] , which, however, cannot entirely stop the co-location only if exclusive hardware platforms are used. Migration-based approach proposed by Moon et al. [26] dynamically limits the duration of co-residency, but it is costly and introduces service downtime during migration. This paper is motivated by the approach of random cache access [9] , [10] , which confuses the attacker about the cache activities he/she detected by randomizing mapping relationship from virtual memory to cache. We propose MemWander, a pluggable hypervisor module that can achieve general and deployable defense against LNSA. MemWander aims to limit the information leakage due to LLC-sharing by dynamically remapping the relationship from security-critical virtual memory (that is, memory whose corresponding cache positions can be monitored to deduce secrets) to different cache positions. Thus, the attacker would be unsure about the cache positions that he/she should monitor to get security-critical cache activities which are used to infer the target sensitive information
The key challenges in realizing this vision in practice are (a) scalability of the dynamic remapping algorithm and (b) impact on application performance. For (a), we theoretically analyze and compare different remapping operations, and change the large-scale Integer Linear Programming (ILP) into a much simpler algorithm. For (b), we use a proof of concept implementation in Barham et al. [27] , and evaluate the response delay and throughput of different sets of web servers, as well as the additional overhead of different programs from the PARSEC benchmarks [28] , [29] and some practical applications. The result shows that the performance impact on applications is tolerable since it is no more than 7% even in the most costly case. However, for emerging attacks that rely on shared memory (i.e., Flush+Reload), we acknowledge the need for out-of-band defense.
Contributions and Roadmap: In summary, this paper makes four contributions:
• We describe and formalize LNSA ( §III);
• We propose VMM-based periodical memory dynamic remapping of the relationship from virtual memory to cache as a general defense against LNSA ( §IV);
• We develop a practical and scalable dynamic remapping strategy that can handle different number of VMs and workloads ( §V); FIGURE 1. Mapping memory from virtual address to cache.
• We develop and evaluate a practical implementation of MemWander by extending Xen ( §VI, §VII). The rest of paper is organized as follows: Related work is given in §II. At end of this paper, we discuss potential attacks against MemWander in §VIII, before concluding in §IX.
II. RELATED WORK A. MEMORY MAPPING IN VIRTUALIZATION
For virtualized environment in the cloud, there are four different concepts of memory addresses: Guest's Virtual Address (GVA), Guest's Physical Address (GPA), Host's Virtual Address (HVA), and Host's Physical Address (HPA). In order to access memory content, a GVA has to be translated into HPA so that actual physical memory can be indexed. As is shown in Fig. 1 , this translation usually falls into two steps since we can take GPA and HVA as the same thing: GVA to GPA and HVA to HPA. For simplicity, we refer to GVA as virtual address, GPA as physical address and HPA as machine address in the rest of this paper. The first translation is implemented by the MMU of guest VM's operating system, and the second is fulfilled by the hypervisor's MMU with the secondary page table (EPT/NPT). After this address translation, the corresponding cache is indexed by bits of the machine address. In this paper, we utilize the function of the secondary page table which maps physical memory to machine memory by modifying it to confuse the attacker about the relationship between accessed virtual memory and observed cache activities.
B. DEFENSE OF RANDOM CACHE ACCESS
Among all defense against cache-based side-channel attacks, random cache access, indicated by its name, makes cache access randomized which confuses the attacker about the relationship between observed cache activities and value of demanded secret. Currently, there are two approaches that both are designed in hardware layer. In 2007, Wang and Lee [10] proposed a new cache structure which consists of two concepts: Partition-Locked cache (PLcache) and Random Permutation cache (RPcache). The PLcache adds a Locking tag and an ID tag to original cache line to reserve the exclusive use of a cache line for certain owner, which realizes the concept of cache partitioning between different users. The RPcache intends to increase a protected tag and an ID tag to mark protected cache lines, as well as keeping a randomized redirection table translating mapping from machine memory to cache so as to randomize cache accesses through permutation of that table. Instead of changing original cache lines, Wang and Lee [9] again developed the RPcache to create a novel cache architecture with enhanced performance and security, which is fulfilled through creating a much larger logic cache than physical cache by using k more bits of the machine address to directly map that logic cache. An additional table is established to keep mapping relationship from logic cache to physical cache so that the actual cache set can be indexed.
Although both methods are efficient to provide enough security, they have an inevitable shortage as implementation in hardware, which is too specific to a certain platform and cannot be deployed immediately. Compared with random cache access which disturbs the mapping relationship at hardware layer, our defense realizes the confusion by dynamically remapping memory at hypervisor layer, which is more common and easily deployable.
C. CACHE TEMPLATE ATTACK
Cache template attack [30] is an automated cache attacks on LLC which takes two steps: profiling and exploitation. In the profiling stage, a matrix storing cache-hit ratio (ratio between the number of cache hits and that of target events, such as a keystroke or an encryption) is established by continuous Flush+Reload attacks to represent the relationship between the cache-hit ratio and the value of target secret (the event). Then in the exploitation stage, this matrix is used along with observed cache-hit ratio, in order to deduce which event happened, thus deriving concrete value of secret.
In this paper, we are interested in the profiling stage of cache template attack, which can automatically locate memory in a binary, on which cache activities can be used to carry out cache attacks. We call this type of memory as securitycritical memory. Memory pages that contain security-critical memory are our defense targets which needs to be automatically located, as is described in §IV.
III. ADVERSARY MODEL
In this section, we describe the attacking process of LNSA, which is followed by formalization of its time attribute.
A. ATTACK PROCESS OF LNSA
LNSA is a type of cache-based side-channel attack which relies on sharing of LLC with no common memory between the attacker VM and the victim VM, the whole process of which can be carried out with the following steps [1] , [2] :
• Step 1: Preparing. Create a series of eviction sets which are used to probe each (of necessary) cache set in LLC;
• Step 2: Locating. Search all cache positions (sets) to find out cache positions to be monitored; FIGURE 2. Prime+Probe operation.
•
Step 3: Spying. Trigger sensitive operation of the victim (usually for many times), and monitor cache activities of corresponding cache positions;
• Step 4: Post-processing. Analyze cache traces to derive the sensitive information. Among these steps, Steps 1-3 are online operations, while
Step 4 can be done offline.
Step 3 is mainly composed of sequential spying operations, based on which LSNA can be divided into LLC-based Prime+Probe [1] , [2] and LLC-based Evict+Time. In this paper, we take LLC-based Prime+Probe as an example of LNSA that MemWander can handle. Although there is no direct study about the latter attack by so far, it is definitely a possible type of LNSA, and our defense is able to deal well with it without significant modifications, as described in §VIII. The reason of Step 2 lies in the character of non-memory-sharing in LNSA. Since the attacker and the victim do not share memory, the attacker has no idea about where the security-critical memory resides, so he/she has to scan all possible cache positions to find them. Here the security-critical memory refers to those memories that the way of accessing them during sensitive operation of the victim can reflect different values of target information which the attacker wants from the victim. For example, the square-and-multiply algorithm [31] would conduct a multiply operation following a square operation if current bit of exponent is 1, otherwise only the square operation happens. We can refer to the memory address of multiply operation as security-critical memory in this case.
The scanning operations of Step 2 can be conducted in parallel, while each operation is usually one round of Prime+Probe which consists of the following three steps, as shown in Fig. 2 .
• Step A: Priming. The attacker accesses enough different memory addresses that map to the same cache set so as to evict the content of all cache lines;
• Step B: Waiting. The attacker waits for some time, during which victim's operation(s) might contend for the cache and fill some cache lines with his/her own data; •
Step C: Probing. The attacker again accesses the same set of different memory addresses, and determines whether the victim has accessed this cache set by measuring the access time. Then we assume the following features of LSNA [1] , [2] :
• The attacker searches the LLC at the granularity of memory pages. That is, among sequential cache sets that are mapped to a single memory page, we just need to scan those that store security-critical memory;
• The security-critical memory that would be used in the spying stage might be separated in multiple memory pages, each of which should be scanned separately since the allocation of memory pages is randomized;
• The ability of the attacker is limited so that he/she cannot scan the whole LLC by only once to find a page. This is reasonable since LLC is usually so large that a lot of pages can be accommodated, while the number of VCPU assigned to the attacker is restricted.
• The attacker is reasonable and smart. That is, the attacker would not take the spying step until he/she has successfully located the correct cache position(s).
• The overall information that the attacker gets from different trials of LNSA is the maximum value of information derived in each attack if each trial (maybe except the first one which needs to create eviction sets) is carried out following the same process. This is reasonable since each time the attacker gets information from the start bit, as in attacking square-and-multiply exponentiation in [1] , or from the block of keys as in attacking AES in [2] .
B. FORMALIZING THE ATTACK DURATION
To formalize the time attribute of LNSA on any secret, we need the following notations as shown in Table 1 .
Obviously, defense should focus on the online stages of LNSA, the time duration of which can be expressed as:
The inspiring idea of random cache access [9] , [10] is trying to interfere with the locating stage, whose time duration is:
This expression refers to the product of the number of paralleled scanning and the overhead of single scanning operation. It indicates the fact that reasonable attacker would scan all possible cache positions without replication so as to locate useful cache position(s). Since there are N SP pages that need to be located separately, the upper limit of times of paralleled scanning should be expanded to
The value of T ATT varies according to different sensitive operations of the victim and numbers of repeated operations. For example, one round of the spying stage of LNSA against square-and-multiply exponentiation lasts at least for the whole process of that algorithm which is definitely different from that of sliding window exponentiation. The number of repeated times depends on the noise of current environment. A noise-free background would only consume one or two operations, whereas a very noisy environment might take dozens of operations.
For T OTHER which represents other possible time cost, we can assume T OTHER ≈ 0 since MemWander would provide more security if it considers a faster attack. With regard to T CES , Step 1 for the first time of LNSA is necessary since there should be usable memory addresses to perform locating operation. However, if the attacker fails in the first trial, the second attempt could skip Step 1, so T CES might be optional. We set T CES = 0 to prepare for the second trial of a skilled attacker so that MemWander can defend against faster LNSA. Therefore, the defense problem turns to be that the security-critical memory should be remapped to other cache positions before the attacker finishes the online part of LNSA at T SUM , thus preventing the attack from deriving the whole secret he/she wants.
IV. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
In this section, we provide a high-level overview of the MemWander system which provides a general and deployable mechanism to defend against LNSA discussed in the previous section. Fig. 3 shows the overall system architecture of MemWander.
A. HIGH-LEVEL IDEA AND SECURITY IMPLICATIONS
Recall that we consider an adversary model which only needs the sharing of LLC between the attacker and the victim, so every VM is a potential side-channel threat. Our goal is to provide a general and deployable mitigation mechanism against this threat model. One likely deployable solution is random cache access [9] , [10] that randomizes the mapping relationship from memory to cache, so as to confuse the attacker about the relationship between monitored cache activities and value of the secret. At the same time, other unbearable shortages of current defenses can be avoided. However, they are currently implemented in hardware layer. Compared with implementations in other layers, adoption of new hardware techniques is a complex process, which may involve considerations of side effects (e.g., power consumption) and economic feasibility. Therefore, it might take years before these techniques are merged into production and finally used in clouds. However, this solution does provide an intuition on how we can properly defend against LNSA, namely remapping the relationship from virtual memory to cache to confuse the attacker.
Based on this insight, we envision a VMM-based approach to conduct memory remapping where cloud clients leverage the cloud providers as a trusted ally via an opt-in ''remappingas-a-service''. Our specific contribution here is to adopt dynamic change of the mapping relationship between guest VM's physical memory and machine memory in hypervisor layer, as is shown above in Fig. 4 .
The security implications of MemWander lies in remapping each guest VM's physical page containing security-critical memory (which we refer to as sensitive page, or SP) to another machine page that maps to a different cache position from the previous machine page before T SUM . Faster the remapping is, smaller probability of successful LNSA there would be. When T SUM < T LSP + T ATT , which means the remapping interval is less than time of single scanning operation followed by the spying stage, no successful complete LNSA attack would ever be possible.
In order to serve clients with different security demands, we provide different levels of security protections for clients' sensitive data. In this paper, we set up three levels of security guarantee as No-security (NS), Low-security (LS) and Highsecurity (HS), respectively. The level of NS, as indicated by its name, provides no security protection at all since it is used when the client has his own defense strategy or does not care about the safety of his data at all. The other two levels of security differ in the time interval between remapping operations, of which interval of LS is longer to provide basic protections for data like network traffic [32] . In contrast, sensitive pages of the clients in HS are remapped much more frequently to provide strong defense for data like encryption or decryption keys. Of course, clients will be charged more when they apply for higher security protection, while NS costs them no extra fee for security.
B. HIGH-LEVEL SPECIFICATIONS OF MEMWANDER 1) CLIENT API
MemWander allows clients to submit new defense tasks by delivering the secret and its corresponding program through Client API. For example, a client can upload the exponent and the GnuPG binary through Client API for protecting the victim against LNSA on square-and-multiply algorithm. Then MemWander will automatically locate all sensitive pages that contains security-critical memory for protection with KeyMemLocator before actual execution of GnuPG binary.
2) KEYMEMLOCATOR
In order to get all sensitive pages that need protection, this component runs the following algorithm:
As is shown above, this algorithm takes secret and its corresponding processing program as inputs, and outputs a series of sensitive memory pages that need protection. For each binary of the program, KeyMemLocator divides it into blocks with size of a page (usually 4KB) (Line 4), and keeps as a single block the end of that binary that might be smaller than a page size. Similarly, binaries that are smaller than a page size would be treated as single blocks. Then each such block would be further divided into pieces with size of a cache line (Line 5).
Afterwards, each piece of the binary is checked for potential side-channel attack by function Profile (Line 8) which is the first stage of cache template attack [30] as described in §II-C. If any piece is found to be useful to cache attack, the block(s) it belongs to would be passed to function Loc (Line 12) which aims to locate the memory page that contains this block. This function intercepts the page fault handler at VOLUME 7, 2019
Algorithm 1 KeyMemLocator
Input: K SEC -Secret of the client; S BIN = {B 1 , B 2 , ..., B N }-N binaries of the program which processes. Output: S SP = {P 1 , P 2 , ..., P M }-M sensitive pages which contain security-critical memory related to K SEC . Procedure:
for k ← 0 to 4KB/S CL do:
13. end if 14.end for end for hypervisor layer which deals with the case that no memory page has been allocated for current accessed memory address (guest VM's physical address) yet. After new machine page has been allocated, and current accessed memory content has been loaded into this new page, we search this page to match the block. In this way, we can get all sensitive pages to be protected.
It should be pointed out that this algorithm has to be run offline since it is a little costly especially when K SEC contains low-frequency events. An event, in terms of a cache template attack, can be anything that involves code execution or data accesses. For example, it can be low-frequency events such as keystrokes or receiving an email, or high-frequency events such as encryption with one or more key bits set to a specific value [30] . 200 low-frequency events (e.g. keypress) for a 1MB binary can be profiled with 17 seconds after full optimization, while a single high-frequency event (e.g. encryption) of the same binary would cost only negligible runtime. Therefore, the client should deliver the secret and the program a bit earlier before execution of sensitive operations so that KeyMemLocator can get enough time to locate all sensitive pages. In this paper, we suggested 200 seconds as enough advanced time for the clients according to the experiments of [30] . To make our system more reliable, we can increase an optional strategy as relying to the client after locating all sensitive pages by KeyMemLocator. The client should never start the sensitive operation before receiving the acknowledgement from our system, which can be implemented as return value of the Client API called.
Since remapping operation is non-trivial, we limit the number of protected pages for each VM so as to prevent some malicious users from applying too many memory pages for protection, namely the DoS (Denial of Service) attack against MemWander. Another method is to charge more if a client requires more sensitive pages, which is reasonable according to the principle of pay-as-you-go in clouds.
3) WORKFLOW
Now, we describe the end-to-end workflow of MemWander. When a client VM is started, the owner has to decide the desired security level, and to insert that in the request for the new instance. If the request is approved, the security level will be recorded by the cloud provider. Afterwards, if the client wants to conduct some sensitive operations in this VM, the secret to be protected and its processing program should be delivered through the Client API. Then KeyMemLocator would get all sensitive pages related to that secret and add them to the poor. After that, MemWander runs a Dynamic Remapping Algorithm with the goal of remapping those sensitive pages to other cache positions before the end of current defense interval for this VM. To this end, the Dynamic Remapping Algorithm takes a few key inputs to decide a remapping policy (Fig. 5 ).
• Sensitive Pages: This is target pages which need be remapped before the end of VM's defense interval;
• Configurations: It is configurations of the target VM, including the secondary page table (EPT/NPT) which is used to change mapping relationship from memory to cache. It also includes the amount of computing power assigned to each VM. This is used to calculate the maximum ability of potential attackers (T LSP ), thus a reasonable defense time can be decided;
• Security level of current VM: This is the level of protection that the client requires for current VM. Using these inputs, the Dynamic Remapping Algorithm computes the remapping operations for the next defense interval. The provider runs a Remapping Engine which takes the output of the algorithm to conduct remapping operations on related memory pages, LLC, and Translation Lookaside Buffer (TLB). Of course, EPT/NPT will be modified, as well as associated M2P table and shadow page table. C. CHALLENGES Having described this high-level view of MemWander, we highlight key practical challenges we need to address to turn this vision into practice:
• Efficient algorithm: Given all sensitive pages to be remapped, we need efficient algorithm that can bring enough security as required under acceptable additional overhead due to defense;
• Scalability: Hardware platforms with high capacity can hold tens or even hundreds of VMs, within which multiple services which process clients' secrets might be running. Therefore, the Dynamic Remapping Algorithm must be capable of scaling to such large cases in the cloud. While the problem can be theoretically formulated as a large constrained optimization problem, time required by the security level might be insufficient to even solve a problem with 100MB memory pages assigned to a client VM, of which 5 are sensitive pages ( Fig. 12 in §VII);
• Deployability: MemWander must be easily deployable with minimal changes to the existing production stack and control platforms without modifications to any hardware, operating system or application. In §VI, we show how we design efficient and scalable algorithm that can handle the first two challenges. Then a prototype of MemWander is implemented as a pluggable Xen module in OpenStack in §VI, which shows the feasibility of deploying MemWander to practical production cloud. Furthermore, we show in §VII with simulated workloads that we can achieve good bounds on information leakage using different security-level defense strategies and that the impact on typical cloud workloads (e.g., replicated web services) is acceptable.
V. DYNAMIC REMAPPING ALGORITHM
In this section, we elaborate on the efficient and scalable dynamic remapping algorithm, which is used to determine remapping operations in the next defense interval. We try to answer the following three questions:
• When to conduct remapping operation?
• What is the range of cache positions that sensitive pages of a guest's VM can be remapped to?
• How to determine the remapping strategy for each sensitive page, that is, which exact cache position should that page be mapped to?
A. WHEN TO REMAP
MemWander carries out side-channel defense by periodically conducting remapping operations for all sensitive pages, of which the critical factor is the interval of remapping. Intuitively, smaller the interval is, better the defense will be. To get the proper defense interval, we first need to figure out how probability of successful LNSA of the attacker changes with different intervals. Here a successful LNSA refers to the case that the attacker has correctly derived all portions of the secret. Therefore, that probability is influenced by all stages of LNSA, of which only the locating stage and spying stage are necessary since we can assume T CES = 0 if attacker prepares the eviction set at previous round of LNSA, and T OTHER = 0 if we defend against a stronger attack eliminating other trivial time cost. In order to derive the success probability P LNSA of LNSA, we define the confusing noisy rate ε (0 ≤ ε ≤ 1), a variable indicating the probability of cases where surrounding noise is able to destroy the victim's activities on the correct cache position for LNSA to a degree where the attacker would not take that position as the correct one. Accordingly, another variable η (0 ≤ η ≤ 1), called reducing noisy rate, is defined to represent the probability of cases where surrounding noise is able to stop the attacker from deriving 100% of the secret. Then we can get the relationship between P LNSA and defense interval T as follows:
where
Here is the explanation. When the interval is less than T ATT + N SP × T LSP , the attacker will never have enough time for locating the N SP pages (N SP × T LSP since each page should be located separately) and completing the spying stage (T ATT ). Therefore, there is no chance for the attacker to conduct a successful LNSA. When the interval is no less than T ATT + N SP × N CP /M × T LSP , the attacker has enough time to scan each possible position for N SP times to locate all N SP pages, which means the value of P LNSA is only influenced by the noise. Here we assume that ranges of possible positions of different pages are same since when being remapped, all these pages would be protected without difference.
When the value of interval is between T ATT + i × T LSP and T ATT + (i + 1) × T LSP (where the smaller end can be reached, while the larger end cannot), and i and x j satisfy (4)(5), things become a bit complicated. For a specific value of i which determines the value of defense interval, there are many cases of a successful LNSA corresponding to how i is divided into a group of x j under different combination where x j defines the number of scanning operations involved in locating the j-th sensitive page. For any attacker, only one combination can be taken as the practical case of his/her locating stage. When the practical combination is decided under a given i, the probability of successful locating of j-th sensitive page is ( positions under scanning, and the noise can be dealt with at the probability of 1 − ε. Multiplying all j values accompanied by β = 1−η, we will P LNSA . This value remains the same for any value between T ATT + i × T LSP and T ATT + (i + 1) × T LSP , because except the time of spying stage, the remaining time indicates the ability to complete i times of scanning, and the (i + 1)-th scanning cannot be done.
In this paper, we envision three levels of security in MemWander which correspond to different defense intervals, as is shown in the Table 2 above.
While NS indicates no remapping defense required by the client (the interval can be regarded as +∞), HS should provide high-level security for which we assign T ATT +N SP × T LSP − . is a positive value which is relatively small compared with T ATT +N SP ×T LSP , the upper limit of HS's defense interval. We can take = 0 in practice since we have ignored both T CES and T OTHER . In this case, the successful attack can be carried out at a theoretical probability of 0 according to (3) . The security level of LS is lower than HS, so its defense interval should be set between T ATT + N SP × T LSP and T ATT + N SP × N CP /M × T LSP which is the minimum time for a 100% successful LNSA. In this paper, we consider time duration of the case where scanning each sensitive page costs 1/2× N CP /M ×T LSP . It brings a success probability as (α/2) N SP β, which is enough is most cases of LS protection. Of course, this value can be changed according to different requirements of LS security.
The feasibility and overhead under defense intervals of LS and HS will be demonstrated in §VII. It should be pointed out that we assume an attack that is equipped with limited capability in case the attacker scans the whole LLC by only once. When that extremely rare case occurs, we only provide security levels of NS and HS which are enough for protection, because different meaningful intervals are already impossible.
B. WHAT TO REMAP
After determining the defense interval, we now discuss where a certain sensitive page can be remapped to. Intuitively, we can remap this page to any cache position on LLC, which, however, is infeasible due to the following two reasons:
• Potential security risk: If sensitive page of a VM is remapped to a cache position, of which no mapped machine page belongs to that VM, this remapping operation involves changing memory content between different security domains. This should be forbidden so as to prevent any possible information leakage;
• Disordered management: The strategy of completely random remapping would possibly require exchanging machine pages owned by different VMs, which might cause confusion with respect to the management: Different VMs have different security levels which indicate different remapping intervals. If a sensitive page of VM with HS is scheduled to be remapped to machine pages that are owned by different VMs of LS or NS, whereas it is not time for remapping those pages yet, should this page be remapped? If it is remapped, the security level of other VM has been changed, which is definitely not allowed. Inspired by the above analysis, we can figure out that remapping between pages of the same VM is a feasible solution. Besides, an empirical insight is that each VM would be allocated a lot of memory (usually 200MB or more) in the cloud, which contains a number of pages (usually 50K or more). Therefore, enough cache positions are available, which we will show later in §VII.
C. HOW TO REMAP
Now we need to figure out where each sensitive page will be remapped to. We begin by describing the high-level problem that we need to solve, and highlight the scaling limitations of strawman solution. Then, we present the main idea of a substitution that enables a scalable realization.
1) PROBLEM FORMALIZATION
We begin by describing the abstract problem that the dynamic remapping algorithm needs to solve to show why this problem is intractable in practice. For each VM of LS or HS, the algorithm needs to compute the new cache positions for all sensitive pages at the end of each defense interval with the goal of minimizing the remapping overhead. Of course, Security should not be achieved at the cost of scalability. Our problem target size (i.e. large public cloud deployment) is no less than hundreds of thousands of memory pages with roughly 4-5 VM slots in a normal hardware platform.
According to [1] , T LSP is a value usually no larger than 35000 time slots with 5000 cycles per slot, and we assume T ATT as the duration of a decryption which takes about 7000 time slots. On a platform with CPU frequency of 2.5 GHz, the defense interval of HS is no larger than 0.09s if there is only one page for certain secret. Therefore, a reasonable time expense of computing the remapping assignments for one interval would be roughly of the order of 0.01s. This allows the defense interval to be as small as of the order of 0.01s, which is required by HS.
Intuitively, we can model remapping as optimization problem subject to security requirements, and solve it by setting up ILP. In order to separate different cases of remapping operations, we divide the allocated memory pages of a VM into three types: Protected Page (PP) which contains securitycritical memory, Occupied Page (OP) which is occupied by non-security-critical and Vacant Page (VP) which is empty pages reserved for the VM [33] . It should be pointed out that PP is different from SP which is a guest physical page, although a SP would be mapped to different PPs by our remapping operations. Our target is to remap the guest physical page corresponding to each current PP to another new PP which maps to a different cache position while minimizing the overhead. Therefore, there are three different types of methods to realize the target of remapping as follows:
• Operation PP-PP: Exchanging mappings of two guest physical pages, each of which is mapped to a PP;
• Operation PP-OP: Exchanging mapping of a guest physical page that is mapped to a PP with another guest physical page that is mapped to an OP;
• Operation PP-VP: Exchanging mapping of a guest physical page that is mapped to a PP with another guest physical page that is mapped to a VP. In order to set up ILP for a VM at the end of each defense interval, we need additional notations in Table 3 . The values of first two notations should be derived from the hypervisor before solving the ILP, since they would change along with the status of the VM and the hypervisor. It is possible that sensitive pages exchange with each other to occupy most of remapping operations, which will limit the remapping space of each sensitive page to reduce N CP . So N PP−PP max is set to limit the number of operation PP-PP.
And the ILP would be as follows:
Objective Function:
Constraints:
Our target is to derive minimum overhead to provide required security, as shown in (8) (16) (17) and (18) . Equation (9) limits the range of each value of our variable matrix ExPage as '0' or '1', and (10) prohibits the exchange of a page with itself. Equation (11) shows the symmetry of ExPage before index N PP . Equations (12) and (13) regulate that each guest physical page mapped to PP should be changed for precisely once, and any OP or VP can be used at most once for remapping. Equation (14) controls the amount of exchange between sensitive pages to avoid limited remapping space, followed by (15) which guarantees that each time the sensitive page would be remapped to a different cache position.
Unfortunately, solving this ILP is intractable. It takes more than 1.8 seconds to even solve a small problem with just 100MB memory, of which machine pages are uniformly spread on different cache positions and 5 of them are sensitive pages (Fig. 12 in  §VII) . Thus, while the ILP approach is an exact optimal solution in terms of the defense overhead subject to security, it is far from viable in terms of the scalability requirements. This motivates the need for a substitution as we describe next.
2) SEQUENTIAL CLASSIFIED SELECTION
For scalability, we resort to separate selection by three different remapping operations. Then the question becomes how to decide the composition of each operation for optimal result. VOLUME 7, 2019 First of all, we need to figure out the relationship among these three remapping operations by comparing their security improvements and defense overhead, which should be evaluated according to their concrete steps. The first two operations are carried out following same major procedure: a) For selected two machine pages (mp 1 and mp 2 ), get their respective guest physical page frames (gpp 1 and gpp 2 ) from the M2P table (a page table in VMM used to translate a VM's machine pages to their corresponding physical pages) [29] maintained by the hypervisor; b) Search the secondary page table (EPT/NPT) following the translation process from guest physical page to machine page to get entries of these two pages (pte 1 Since the size of a page is no less than 4KB, the major overhead of three operations lies in copying memory content from one page to another, which is demonstrated by Fig. 12 in §VII. Here we assume that exchanging contents of two memory pages consists of three-step copy operations, the relationship between overhead of three operations is:
Moreover, we define the security improvement of each remapping operation as number of sensitive pages that have been remapped: SR PP 
For larger experimental setting than ILP (VM of 500MB memory, of which 10 pages are sensitive), this algorithm costs negligible overhead (36ms in Fig. 12 of  §VII) , which well meets the time requirement of calculation. Although the overhead of our algorithm has been well controlled, time for defense will increase in proportion with the number of remapping operations. So it is hard for us to guarantee that these scheduled operations could be done within the interval of HS if there are large numbers of PPs to be remapped. Therefore, we use delayed remapping, which would not conduct remapping operations until corresponding pages are accessed. When any remapping operation is arranged by sequential classified selection, the two pages involved will be just marked as inaccessible. Afterwards, when either page is accessed, we carry out remapping operation for both pages, and then render them accessible again. If neither of pages is accessed during current defense interval, we just cancel this remapping operation, and recover the access to both pages.
Delayed remapping works with the insight that the adversary is able to perform a successful LNSA only if the victim accesses sensitive pages to conduct security related operations in both locating and spying stage during the attack. Therefore, we delay remapping to the time when possible attack happens during the client's sensitive computation, which guarantees required security. Another advantage is that those arranged pages which are not accessed during current defense interval will be re-scheduled in the next interval, thus avoiding unnecessary defense overhead.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we introduce our prototype of MemWander implemented in OpenStack [34] following the structure in Fig. 3 . We begin with introduction of modifications to OpenStack and Xen, followed by the design of Client API.
A. MODIFICATIONS OF OPENSTACK
OpenStack is a popular open-source cloud operating system that is used to deploy Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) cloud solutions. It controls Compute, Storage, and Network, as well as many other resources in cloud. The key component that interests us is OpenStack Compute (Nova), which usually consists of many parts spread over a Controller node and many Compute nodes (i.e., machines). Each compute node runs a hypervisor, in our case, Xen, which is responsible for managing VMs. To ensure a wide scope for applying We modify this command by adding an additional parameter as -security-level, for which the client can require NS, LS or HS for their respective security demand. Afterwards, this command would be processed following the simplified procedure in Fig. 6 below in OpenStack after the command is received by the 'nova-api' the Compute node as a HTTP request. The red components show where we interfere with this process. After 'nova-api' receives the request, it will parse the request to get various parameters that would be passed to function 'create' of API class in 'nova/compute/api.py' to create the new instance. For this step, we keep the security level of the new VM in a temporary memory, which is stored in an unified structure storing security levels of all VMs when this instance is successfully created in 'nova/virt/libvirt/driver.py'. Our implementation consists of only roughly 90 lines of Python code in the Nova code. In order to realize the remapping engine which takes delayed remapping as its strategy, we introduce implementation of the following three aspects:
1) ALTERING THE ACCESS STATE OF A PAGE
To implement delayed remapping, the pages which are selected to be remapped should be rendered inaccessible. MemWander sets one of the reserved bits, which we denote by RM, in the PTE for those guest physical pages in the VM mapped to machine pages. As such, accesses to any of these pages will be trapped into the Xen and handled by the page fault handler. Upon detecting page faults of this type, the page fault handler will conduct remapping for the accessed machine page and its company page (that is scheduled to remap with current page) which is recorded in a storing structure. When remapping of certain page is finished or no access to that page is detected, the RM bit in its corresponding PTE and its company page's PTE will be cleared to recover normal memory access.
2) MODIFYING THE PAGE TABLE
When remapping a page, its PTE will be changed by a privileged hypercall of Xen as is shown below: HYPERVISOR_update_va_mapping_otherdomain (unsigned long va, pte_t new_val, unsigned long flags, domid_t domid)
This call updates the current page table so that the page pointed by 'va' will reference the machine page 'val'. How TLBs are flushed as a result of this update is indicated by the flags argument, which is split into two parts. The lowest two bits indicate the type of the flush, and the remaining bits define the scope. Three types of TLB flush are possible.
• UVMF_NONE indicates no flush at all;
• UVMF_INVLPG indicates that a single entry can be flushed, which is used in our case;
• UVMF_TLB_FLUSH indicates that the entire TLB contents can be flushed. Moreover, the real type is extracted by the mask of UVMF_FLUSHTYPE_MASK. The remaining bits are used to indicate which TLBs should be flushed. In a uniprocessor system, there is only a single TLB, so this is not particularly important. On others, it may be that a number of threads belonging to a single process are scheduled to run concurrently on different processors. In this case, they will be sharing the same page tables, so an update needs to be propagated. Two flags can simply be OR'd with the value: UVMF_LOCAL or UVMF_ALL indicate either the local TLB or all, respectively. The final option UVMF MULTI means some TLBs should be flushed-exactly which must be specified with a CPU bitmap like in our case. The pointer to this bitmap must be OR'd with the flags argument.
The whole remapping engine is implemented with about 330 lines of C code.
3) CLIENT API
The client API is used by the client to deliver a secret and its processing programs to KeyMemLocator in the hypervisor, which is provided in the following form: boolean requestCSCProtection (string secret, string program) Indicated by the name, the first parameter shows the secret that the client wants to protect (e.g. an encryption key), and the second parameter is the file path of the program which processes the secret. To facilitate clients, we implement a utility tool called CSCDedenseRequester, which takes these elements as inputs, and calls requestCSCProtection to send the request.
To fulfill its functionality, this API would call a hypercall in its code. A hypercall is the interface that Xen gives to the client system to complete some privileged operations such as accessing hardware resources. The procedure of adding a hypercall is just like adding a system call, which is carried out as the following three steps (in X86 platforms): .byte 0 .endr c) Handle header file and C file;
• Header file • C file
VII. EVALUATIONS
In this section, we answer the following three questions:
• Security: What kind of security guarantee can our defense method provide?
• Performance: What is the additional overhead that will be induced by our defense?
• Generality: Can our defense be applicable to different VM systems and different hardware platforms?
A. SECURITY EVALUATION Our security evaluation contains the impact of different parameters on security in 1) and 2), followed by confusion of the attacker observation in 3). In this experiment, we deploy MemWander on the hardware of a Lenovo ThinkCentre M8500t-N0000 desktop, whose parameters are listed in Table 4 below.
To evaluate MemWander under side-channel attacks, we set up an adversary and a victim as follows:
• Victim: A typical target of LNSA is the implementation of square-and-multiply used in decryption. Here we follow [1] to set up a victim that runs square-andmultiply in GnuPG of version 1.4.13. It is compiled to the default build, with a high level of optimization (-O2), and debugging information left in the binary. The victim repeatedly executes the GnuPG binary to decrypt a short file encrypted with a 3,072 bit ElGamal public key. Looking up Wiener's table for a 3,072 bit ElGamal, we get a key length value as 269. GnuPG adds a 50% safety margin, resulting in a key length of 403 bits. The victim VM is configured with operating system of Ubuntu 12.04 which is initially equipped with two VCPUs; VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 7. Success probability of LNSA under different N SP .
• Attacker: The attacker conducts cross-VM LLC-based Prime+Probe attack according to [1] in a VM with same operating system and same number of VCPUs as the victim. In this attack, time is divided into fixed slots of 5,000 cycles each, which is short enough to get multiple probes within each squaring operation. Within each time slot, we prime the cache set, wait to the end of that slot and then probe the same set again. Instead of monitoring the multiply operation, we spy on the square operation, which lasts for 4-5 slots. Different intervals between two square operations indicate different values of a bit. An interval of about 6 slots indicates a '0', while an interval of 16-17 slots indicates a '1'. In addition, scanning each cache set costs roughly 1,000 slots, and complete decryption takes about 7000 slots. Therefore,
T LSP = 3.5 × 10 7 cycles
1) THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
First of all, we analyze the influence of the following parameters of MemWander: N SP which is the number of sensitive pages related to a certain secret, ε and η which are noisy rate of the locating stage and spying stage, N CP which is the number of all possible cache positions for a certain secret, and M which is number of cache positions the attacker can scan in parallel. We give an empirical value for each parameter as follows:
N SP is usually set as 1 since only monitoring securitycritical memory in single page is enough for most of current cache attacks. In order to cover all possible attacking scenarios, we study how this value will affect the success probability of LNSA, as shown in Fig. 7 .
From Fig. 7 , we can clearly observe that the success probabilities under NS and HS are not influenced by N SP since they represent two extremes. For different defense intervals between NS and HS, case of LS shows that the success probability will decrease in an exponential manner, indicating the fact that more sensitive pages of a secret make the attack become harder. It gives us an implication that spreading security-critical memory into as many different cache positions as possible can effectively prevent LNSA.
The noisy rate ε (Confusing Noisy Rate, CNR) and η (Reducing Noisy Rate, RNR) can be any value between 0 and 1 under different conditions, the influence of which is shown in Fig. 8 . The success probability of LNSA decreases along with ε and η when the defense interval is between NS and HS. We can infer that defense would be unnecessary in a very noisy environment. However, the attacker can mitigate their effects by more trials of attacks.
N CP and M control the space of cache scanning, whose influence on different security levels is shown in Fig. 9 . It should be noted that NS has an interval of +∞, which is not displayed here. It is obvious that N CP enlarges the searching space of cache scanning, while M reduces that space. Generally speaking, N CP is related to the memory allocated to the client VM and the distribution of those memories, as well as the mapping relationship between machine memory and cache. With enough memory allocated, M should equal the number of VCPUs allocated to the attacker. , which are used to control number of operation PP-VP and PP-PP, respectively. They influence the overall efficiency of our remapping operations and space of cache positions for remapping. To verify their influences, we build an experimental setting that assigns to the victim with 200MB machine memory, of which 96KB has been assigned to be mapped with sensitive pages (including square-and-multiply algorithm of GnuPG) and 20MB is not used yet. All other memory has been occupied by the system and various applications. Since LLC in our hardware can supply 8M /16 × 4K = 128 different cache positions for a memory page, we let all these 200MB memory randomly spread over all cache positions. The initial VPs occupy 84 of these locations, and PPs occupy 24. There are 16 cache positions which are commonly shared by VPs and PPs. OPs are randomly distributed over all 128 positions. The number of different cache positions that have been occupied by any sensitive page will change along with different defense intervals. We repeat this experiment for 50 times, and the averaged result is shown below in Fig. 10 . Therefore, each remapping operation should be considered when we make decisions on remapping strategies, although only operation PP-VP is most efficient. We will demonstrate this statement in the next subsection.
3) CONFUSION OF THE ATTACKER'S OBSERVATION
In cache attacks, the attacker derives desired secrets from the victim by observing cache behaviors due to sensitive operation of the victim. Instead of preventing the attacker from observing cache activities, MemWander confuses the attacker by breaking the relationship between observed cache behaviors and values of the secret, which can be reflected by true cache activities.
In order to evaluate the effect of our defense on the deviation of observed cache activities from real ones, we set up a confusion matrix which shows the deviation. In our experiment, we assign 200MB memory which is evenly distributed over different cache sets to the victim who used one page of them to store the code of square-and-multiply algorithm. Therefore, there are 128 possible positions for this sensitive page, which might cause the attacker 64 times of scanning to search the whole space since the attacker is assigned with two VCPU. Then we have N CP = 128, M = 2, which can be combined with (24) (25) to get the intervals of LS and HS as T LS = 1.95 × 10 8 cycles, T HS = 4 × 10 7 cycles.
To derive the confusion matrix, we simulate an attacker with knowledge of initial cache position of the squaring code, and LNSA attack lasts for a enough long time so that most of cache positions can be covered due to remapping with a relatively larger probability under even security level of LS. Therefore, we set this value as 128 times of LS intervals. For each attack against decryption, we identify three types of operations of squaring, multiplying and others. The squaring and multiplying are identified following the classification strategy of the attacker at the beginning of this section. When the trace matching square-and-multiply algorithm is located, the squaring operation can be easily identified, and the multiplying operation falls within intervals of two squaring operations which last for 16-17 time slots. The others in that identified trace indicate other types of cache activities, which we count for any single slot that is not regarded as squaring or multiplying. We use a key whose length is 403 bits, of which 200 are '1'. This results in 403 squaring operations and 200 multiplying operations, as well as 570 other operations in a single decryption of about 7000 slots. Table 5 shows the confusion matrices under security level of NS (no defense), LS and HS in each of the three graphs. Table 5 (a) indicates that when there is no remapping defense deployed, the average accuracy of the probing results of squaring and multiplying operations can be roughly 91%, which is well enough for LNSA. When LS is provided, that average accuracy fails badly to about 29%, which is enough to prevent LNSA attacks. What's more, the average accuracy fails to about 0.015% under HS, which indicates that hardly any operations related to square-and-multiply algorithm would be identified, thus providing powerful defense. In our experience, continuing the attack as [1] at the point where the accuracy of probing is below 30% would be extremely difficult. This is, of course, not a proof that no exploitable side-channel still exists, and it is conceivable that a persistent and adaptive attacker could still make progress; however, we believe that MemWander should substantially increase the complexity of doing so.
B. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Our performance evaluation consists of overhead comparison between different settings in multiple cases, which is described as follows. 
1) OVERHEAD OF DIFFERENT REMAPPING OPERATIONS
In §V-C, we propose three types of remapping operations as PP-PP, PP-OP and PP-VP. An important conclusion as expressed in (19) shows the relationship between overhead of different defense operations, which is critical in proving the rationality of algorithm SCS. To demonstrate (19), we implement three test programs each of which executes one type of remapping operation for 10000 times, and records each time of execution. The result is shown in Fig. 11 . It can found out that PP-PP and PP-OP cost almost the same overhead without any large deviation. Each operation PP-VP takes around 4.4×10 −7 seconds, which is approximately half of the amount of cycles used by the other two operations. Therefore, equation (19) is proved to be practically effective.
2) OVERHEAD OF ILP AND SCS
For dynamic remapping algorithm, we first set up an ILP, which is replaced by SCS due to efficiency and scalability. In order to test and compare their defense overhead, we establish different memory settings for the victim with change of total allocated memory and the portion of PPs. The rest two types of memory pages are equal in number. Besides, all pages are evenly distributed over all possible cache positions in LLC. We test each experimental setting for 50 times, and get the average as representative value of overhead, which is shown in Fig. 12 below. Fig. 12(a) shows the computation overhead of ILP and SCS with memory allocated to the victim VM ranging from 100MB to 1GB when number of PPs remains 5. Fig. 12(b) shows the overhead with different number of PPs ranging from 1 to 10 when number of overall pages allocated is 12.5K (500MB). From both figures, we can find out that the minimum overhead used for solving ILP (with 100MB memory and 5 PP) is 1.892s, while the maximum overhead of solving SCS (with 500MB memory and 10 PPs or 1GB and 5 PPs) is 36 ms, which quite satisfies the time requirement to realize periodical remapping.
3) OVERHEAD WHEN BEING ATTACKED
Cache attacks will cause performance degradation because it will preempt CPU and cache memory. So is MemWander due to its remapping operations. Moreover, our defense will further degrade the performance when the victim is under attack, since additional remapping operations caused by the attacker trigger more decryptions. In Fig. 13 , we show results of the runtime overhead on three applications: blackscholes, canneal and dedup from the PARSEC benchmarks [28] , [29] . blackscholes simulates financial analysis such as calculating the prices of a portfolio of options using Black Scholes partial differential equations; canneal uses cache-aware simulated annealing to design chips that minimize routing costs; dedup is short for ''deduplication'', which is a compression utility that combines global and local method so as to obtain a high compression ratio. These benchmark applications with native inputs [29] are selected to represent CPU-bound applications with different amounts of memory and cache usage. Since only Prime+Probe operation which triggers execution of the victim and eviction of the victim's cache content would be able to affect the performance of the victim, we test these applications on cases of different values of the attack interval for Prime+Probe operations.
In Fig. 13 , these applications are evaluated under LNSA in co-located VM respectively as described at the beginning of this section, with and without MemWander. As can be seen in the figure, the attack alone degrades the performance of these applications by up to two orders of magnitude, and MemWander results in further degradation. However, such a further performance loss induced by defense is usually preferred than suffering from LNSA which might cause huge financial loss due to stolen secrets.
4) OVERHEAD OF SECURING PRACTICAL ENCRPTION APPLICATION
In the following experiments we evaluate the performance overhead of MemWander for protecting apache2 processes with the OpenSSL library (libcrypto.so) inked. Our particular interest is in preventing side channel attacks against the cryptographic operations provided by libcrypto.so during the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol used in https connections. We ran an apache 2.2.32 web server with libcrypto.so version 1.0.2, which is hosted in one VM on our prototype platform that also hosts the client in another VM. Fig. 15 shows the degradation of file download throughput caused by MemWander, of which Fig. 15(a) shows the performance of a single apache server within a VM, Fig. 15(b) shows the performance of five servers within a VM, and Fig. 15(c) shows the performance of five coresident VMs each of which is equipped with an apache server. In these experiments, another web server performance measurement tool called httperf [35] is used to produce different rates of requests for a 177-byte file (which is the default index.html file installed with apache2). We launch five new VMs running httperf in another virtualized hardware platform (platform B) which is directed linked to the platform (platform A) hosting our prototype system. For Fig. 15(a) , a VM (one VCPU) running a single server is launched in platform A, and one of httperf VM is used to send requests to saturate this sever. For Fig. 15(b) , a VM (five VCPUs) running five servers is launched in platform A, and all five httperf VMs are used. For Fig. 15(c) , five VM running a single server are launched in platform A, and all five httperf VMs are launched.
Besides, one connection delivers only one request, SSL sessions are not reused, and timeout value of the server's response is set as one second. In order to make sure that the degradation is truly induced by MemWander rather than other factors, we use the top utility to confirm that when the server is saturated, it is CPU-bound which is indicated if its CPU usage and throughput both reach their respective limits at the same time.
As shown in Fig. 15(a) , the maximum throughput of one-CPU apache server decreases from 143.3 replies to 138.1 replies in a second, leading to a degradation of 3.6%. With five servers in a VM, the largest throughput reduces by 1.0%, since that number drops from 726.5 replies to 719.1 replies in a second. This improved performance is due to the fact that sensitive pages of libcrypto.so are shared between different servers, thus the additional overhead due to defense is not increased, while the overall throughput has been promoted. In case of five single-server VMs with deduplication disabled in order to prevent memory-shared cache attacks, this defense overhead raises to 3.2% by cutting down the throughput from 732.7 replies to 709.3 replies per second. This increase in performance is much slower since number of sensitive pages to be remapped is multiplied five times, thus each server bears almost the same overhead as the first case with only one VM hosting a single server. In all cases, the overhead induced by MemWander is modest and acceptable.
5) OVERHEAD OF SECURING OTHER APPLICATIONS
MemWander is designed to protect various applications, which is evaluated here. In addition to three applications from the PARSEC benchmarks in 4) and GnuPG, we select another two applications as encfs and scp. encfs is an encrypted filesystem in user-space, for which we evaluate its file-encryption sub-process protected by MemWander, by encrypting a 1GB file. scp is a network data transfer protocol implemented based on secure shell, and we evaluate it by transferring a 1GB file using scp to record the latency overhead caused by MemWander. All of the above established experiments are tested for 50 times, and the result of the average degradations is shown in Fig. 17 . The labels on top of bars show the baseline runtime in seconds. For all tested applications, the overhead of MemWander is less than 7%, which is tolerable in most scenarios.
6) APPLICABILITY FOR DIFFERENT HARDWARE PLATFORMS
In order to show the generality of MemWander, we deploy our system on two other different hardware platforms, whose parameters are shown in Table 6 . We also run the apache server supplying the service of file downing in Ubuntu 12.04 (as in 4)) on each platform, with the throughput of all three cases shown in Fig. 16. From Fig. 16 , we can derive the similar result as in 4) above. The maximum throughput of one-CPU apache server on platform 1 decreases from 144.5 replies to 139.9 replies in a second, leading to a degradation of 3.2%. Similarly, the maximum throughput of one-CPU apache server on platform 2 decreases from 146.1 replies to 140.8 replies in a second, leading to a degradation of 3.6%. Therefore, we can conclude that our defense is deployable to other platforms.
VIII. DISCUSSION
In this section, we show some limitations of MemWander, and then introduce some possible future works of our defense.
A. LIMITATIONS 1) DEFENSIVE RANGE AGAINST CACHE ATTACKS
MemWander is designed to defend against LNSA, a popular and powerful cache-based side-channel attack in the cloud which relies on the sharing of LLC without memory deduplication between the attacker and the victim. It might also be possible to defend against cache attacks based on L2 cache which is shared in a CPU core since it is large enough to provide many possible cache positions for a sensitive page, which creates enough space for remapping.
However, for L1-cache-based cache attacks, MemWander would not be an effective defense since there is typically the space of single page in L1 cache which cannot provide enough space to remap sensitive pages so as to confuse the attacker. Besides, MemWander might also be unable to well defend against other types of cache attacks such as the Flush-Reload attack [3] which needs the premise of memory deduplication. However, for timing-based attacks such as Bernstein's attack [36] and Bonneau's attack [37] , we believe that MemWander can create enough noise by remapping to confuse the timing observed by the attacker although defense of this type of cache attacks is our primary target. Besides, since our defense is not exclusive, the defender can incorporate other defense methods to ours so as to provide a comprehensive defense.
2) DEPENDENCY ON THE ATTACKING ATTRIBUTES
The defense intervals of MemWander are calculated based on how different attributes of LNSA, such as the attacker's ability M , time of single scanning T LSP and time of the spying stage T ATT . Although we have considered the maximum computing ability of VMs in a platform for the unknown M and popular values of T LSP and T ATT in practical attacks [1] , [2] , there might be future attacks with more controllable attacking attributes, especially T LSP and T ATT . We will set up a more attack-agnostic defense model in our future work so as to provide a more applicable defense.
B. FUTURE WORK 1) MORE FLEXIBLE SECURITY REQUEST
MemWander allows a client to request protection in granularity of VM, which, however, limits the flexibility of our defense in case the client has different security demands in a single VM. This is relatively easy to realize since we can bind the security demand to each request of protection for a secret by adding a parameter to the Client API.
2) DEALING WITH DIFFERENT TRIALS
In this paper, we assume that overall information derived in different trials of LNSA equals to the maximum of all values. Although it is the common case for most of the attacks, the rest of attacks might be able to derive more information by combining those derived in different trials, such as monitoring keystrokes of the victim. We will take further consideration into the model of how to combining information derived in different trials.
3) MORE GENERAL DEFENSE
Since our defense only targets LNSA, we need to extend it to be able to defend against more kinds of cache attacks so as to increase its generality which is demanded. A possible solution is to integrate the method of cache cleansing, which works by adding enough noise into the side channel established by the attacker.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a general and applicable approach of defense against one type of cache-based side-channel attacks called LNSA, since current solutions lack either generality or practicability. Inspired by random cache access [9] , [10] , we design a novel method called dynamic remapping which periodically remaps the guest VM's physical memory to different machine memory. It will confuse the attacker about the relationship between cache activities which are observed during sensitive operations of the victim, and the secret he/she wants from that victim. After modeling LNSA, we design our system named MemWander, which can be incorporated in popular cloud operating system OpenStack with popular hypervisor Xen. We introduce the workflow of our system and its key components, especially the dynamic remapping algorithm which handles when, what and how to remap for each defense interval. The experimental result shows that MemWander not only provides enough security guarantee even when the client requires low security protection, but also induces tolerable overhead (under 7%) for practical deployment in cloud.
